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1 Introduction
Over the last years, international trade in gas has significantly gained in importance. Traditionally,
gas trade was limited regionally, due to a lack of pipeline infrastructure, and little availability of
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transport capacity. Growing intra-continental trade, e.g. within
North America and Europe/Russia, and the development of LNG-tanker trade have led to an
increasing integration of world gas markets. In the early years of this decade, there was even
some arbitrage with LNG-tankers between the volatile markets of North America and Europe
(Cornot-Gandolphe, 2003; Deutsche Bank, 2003). Thus, one would expect to see increasing price
convergence, now more than ever.
This paper takes a closer look at the period ”before”, i.e. between the mid 1990’s until 2002.
With it, we hope to fill a gap in the existing literature on the relationship between international
gas prices. We thus test the relationship between the international gas market prices in Europe,
North America, and Japan, and their relation to the oil price. Our hypothesis is that for the period
under observation, there was still a certain split of prices between Europe and North America, due
to the observed regional segmentation of markets. We use both a principal component analysis
and cointegration tests to analyze the integration of the European, Japanese and North American
markets for natural gas. We find evidence of integration within the regional European/Japanese
and North American markets, and that the European/Japanese and the North American markets
are connected to a much lesser extent.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section surveys international market structures
and the existing literature on cointegration analysis in the gas markets. Section 3 describes the
price data, whereas Section 4 presents the approach to, and the results of the principal component
analysis and the cointegration tests. Section 5 concludes with ideas for further research.
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2 International Market Structures
2.1 Development of International Natural Gas Markets
In all industrialized countries, natural gas deregulation is changing the structure of the natural gas
markets. Having been regionally segmented until the nineties, they are now developing towards
integrated global markets with new structures. Financial risks of gas import were absorbed by
regional monopolies of transmission and/or distribution companies. Security of supply thus was
provided but was paid for at relatively high prices to industry and households. Now, this situation
has changed significantly. Governments in many parts of the world are liberalizing their gas indus-
tries by introducing gas-to-gas competition based on third-party access to gas supply infrastructure
and/or by privatizing public gas utilities. The emergence of new contract mechanisms such as spot
market, short-term or non-dedicated contracts enforce the restructuring of markets for natural gas.
Moves to liberalize gas markets generally started earlier and have been taken further in Canada,
United States and United Kingdom. Gas market opening is currently underway in continental
Europe.
There are today three main regional gas markets: OECD Europe, with Western Europe im-
porting mainly from Norway, Russia and Algeria; North America, importing from Canada and
Mexico; Japan and South Korea importing mainly from Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia and the
Middle East. Each regional gas market is characterized by specific supply costs and conditions,
gas demand patterns and the prevailing nature of competition.
2.1.1 Pricing Structure in Europe and Japan
Until now prices in the European countries may have still been determined by their linkage to
the prices of alternative oil-based fuels. Most of the gas sold in Europe is based on long-term
take-or-pay contracts. In these contracts, the buyer agrees to receive a certain volume of gas per
year or, alternatively, to pay for the portion of gas it does not want to receive. The current price
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on gas delivered according to the long-term contract is determined by a price formula that links
the current gas price to the price of relevant energy substitutes. Gas prices are thus set at such
a level that the relation between gas prices and oil product prices does not give gas users any
incentive to switch to the alternative fuel. With the so-called netback market value concept, the
price for the gas producers is derived from the end user prices for the cheapest alternative fuel.
Consequently, fluctuations in oil prices are passed on to the producers of the gas. These long-term
contracts include the possibility of price renegotiation to adjust to the oil price every three to six
months.
In the Asian market, 97% of the gas comes from LNG, and Japan alone imports over 50% of
the world production (Cayrade, 2003). As in the European countries, the Asia-Pacific LNG prices
are typically indexed to crude oil prices, either in Japan or Indonesia, in some cases shaped with an
S curve to limit the impact of extreme oil price movements (International Energy Agency, 2002).
This situation now seems to be progressively changing. Thus, the contracts signed by the
British gas trading company Centrica with Norwegian and Dutch gas producers are indexed to the
UK spot market prices. On the continent too, more contracts that are linked, at least in parts, to
the price of gas at trading hubs on continental Europe (Zeebrugge, Bunde) are emerging. Third
party access prompted the development of the first trading Center, Zeebrugge in Belgium, and a
second hub is emerging at Bunde in Germany. On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that for
the time being, oil-price indexation facilitates the development of remote gas sources providing a
secure supply to the European market. Even if short-term trade is increasing, the gas trade on the
continent is supposed to remain influenced by the prices in the long-term contracts as a reference
and also partly by possible switching from gas to oil in some large industries. Market hubs are still
in their infancy in continental Europe and so far, the transactions are limited.
3
2.1.2 Pricing Structure in North America and the United Kingdom
With gas-to-gas competition, the above-mentioned formal linkage between gas prices and oil prod-
uct prices is not supposed to exist anymore in the short term, and the supply and demand of
gas will determine the gas price. In North America, gas-to-gas competition has been developed,
supply and demand are matched by market mechanisms, and the market is liquid and until now
self-sufficient. The UK is in a similar position, with a fully liberalized, competitive and currently
self-sufficient gas market (International Energy Agency, 2003).
But even in such a situation, gas prices and oil product prices are still linked in some way. In
the longer term, the availability and prices of oil substitutes in addition to the user’s technical
possibilities to change fuels will still co-determine gas prices. Even though there is no general
contractual linkage in the American pricing structure, there is frequently some market linkage
between oil product prices and the Henry Hub gas prices. And in the UK, the opening of the
Interconnector in 2000 has linked the UK gas market with the continental wholesale gas price,
dominated by the contractual linkage with oil.
2.1.3 The LNG Markets
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) represents 22% of the world’s total cross-border gas trade, and
markets for LNG are undergoing a substantial ”revolution” at the moment (Jensen, 2003). Trade
in LNG doubled in the past decade and there is a broad industry consensus that the coming years
will experience strong growth, as demand is expected to double to approximately to 220-270 BCM
per year by 2010 (International Energy Agency, 2002; Deutsche Bank, 2003).
There are three current markets: the Asian market, dominated by the high demand of Japan;
the North American market; and the European market. In 2001, 71% of the world demand for
LNG was concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region and 29% in the Atlantic basin alone (Cornot-
Gandolphe, 2003). The common contract form for the LNG business is the LNG Sales and Pur-
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chasing Agreement (SPA). There are different pricing systems used in the three major market
regions of Asia-Pacific, Europe and the USA. In the Asia-Pacific, LNG prices are indexed to crude
oil prices. In Europe, LNG competes with pipeline gas and adopts similar formulae which are
typically indexed to crude oil or oil products (gas oil and fuel oil) although there may also be
elements of coal, electricity or inflation indexation. In the USA, gas prices are set by gas-to-gas
competition, driven by supply and demand. LNG-delivered prices are typically based on Henry
Hub gas prices plus or minus a locational differential reflecting the basis between the LNG delivery
point and the Henry Hub. As far as the short-term trading is concerned, the LNG spot market
has experienced a real boom in 2001. Spot sales rose to 11.4 BCM in 2001, an increase of 51% over
2000. In 2001, short-term LNG trading represented 8% of global LNG trade (International Energy
Agency, 2002). Until now there has been no physical interregional LNG trade between the three
regional markets (Europe, North America and Asia). Short-term LNG trades may follow a variety
of pricing structures, including indexation to crude oil product prices or netback from pipeline gas
prices.
2.2 Literature Survey
There are only a few studies on the integration of regional gas markets, and the linkages between
the international gas markets have so far not been analyzed at all. Here we review the major
studies on regional gas price integration that have used similar approaches to those of this paper.
2.2.1 Studies on North America
De Vany and Walls (1995) analyze the degree of integration of the North American gas market
and the way price dynamics evolved as these markets were progressively embedded in a larger web
of open pipelines and interconnected markets. Daily spot prices in six networks of six or nine
pipeline interconnection points, across North America, partitioned into three one-year sub-samples
(1987-1990), are investigated. Results show an increasing level of network connectedness as well as
5
an increasing speed of shock absorption by the networks and thus a growing efficiency of arbitrage
mechanisms. With the two-step Engle-Granger test for co-integration, spot prices are thus found
to be increasingly co-integrated as open access to the pipelines expands through the network.
King and Cuc (1996) investigate the strength of spot price integration between various natural
gas producing basins of North America, from the the mid 1980’s untill the mid 1990’s and with
time varying parameter (Kalman Filter) and co-integration analysis. Bivariate cointegration tests
(Engle-Granger procedure) results are qualitatively similar to De Vany and Walls (1995). Time
varying parameter analysis results indicate that price convergence has been emerging in regional
markets, but that an east-west split in natural gas pricing has also been emerging.
Serletis (1997), in a slightly different manner, test for shared stochastic trends in the North
American markets in order to investigate the robustness of the results of King and Cuc (1996).
Evidence concerning the shared stochastic trends in eight North American natural gas spot markets,
using monthly data (1990 : 06 − 1996 : 01), is obtained by the Engle-Granger approach and the
Johansen maximum likelihood approach. Prices within eastern and western areas are found to
be driven by different stochastic trends. It contradicts the conclusion of King and Cuc (1996):
arbitrages within these markets fail to discipline prices and there is no east-west split in the North
American markets.
Serletis and Herbert (1999) investigate the dynamics of North American natural gas, fuel oil
and power prices in the area of eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware, using
daily data (1996 : 10 − 1997 : 11) on the Henry Hub and Transco Zone 6 natural gas prices, the
PJM (Pennsylvania, New-Jersey and Maryland) power market for electricity price and the fuel oil
price for New York Harbor. Correlation between prices in log levels is first investigated and the
stationary properties of the prices are analysed using the ADF test. The Engle-Granger bivariate
cointegration test for the pairs of integrated series shows that each pair cointegrate, leading to the
conclusion that the same underlying stochastic component affects the three markets.
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2.2.2 Studies on the European Market
Little empirical work has been carried out with respect to the market integration for natural gas
in Europe. Asche et al. (2002) examine whether the German market is integrated by investigating
time series of Norwegian, Dutch and Russian Gas monthly export prices to Germany from January
1990 to December 1997. The Johansen multivariate procedure results show that gas from the three
suppliers compete closely in the same markets since the prices move proportionally over time, but
at different price levels. Asche et al. (2000) investigate the degree of market integration for France,
Germany and Belgium in a similar way. Cointegration tests show that the different border prices
for gas to France move proportionally over time and without any significant differences in mean.
Furthermore, national markets in Germany, France and Belgium are found to be highly integrated.
3 Description of the Data Set
For the empirical analysis, we use standard international import prices from the major gas con-
suming regions of the world (Europe, USA, Japan). Import prices represent a weighted average
based on all imports for which prices are available, hence there are no pipeline import prices for
Japan, as all natural gas is being imported via LNG. European prices are the average of all Mem-
ber States importing the commodity and merely give an indication of the average import cost
rather than a precise and exact import price1. American import prices are derived calculating the
average of nine countries exporting LNG and only two countries (Canada and Mexico) delivering
pipeline gas. Monthly data in US$/MBTU is available since 1993. Japanese LNG import prices
are derived in the same way by calculating the average of eight countries exporting LNG. To verify
the close interaction of oil and gas prices, we furthermore include monthly average Brent crude oil
spot prices. Monthly average crude oil prices are calculated from daily quotations and are quoted
in US$/bbl thus converted into US$/MBTU using the standard conversion factor (1 bbl crude =
1See the notes on definitions in International Energy Agency (2002) for details.
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5.46 MBTU). The data described above was taken from several IEA publications ”Energy Prices
& Taxes” quarterly statistics. Since the liberalization of American gas markets encouraged the
emergence of spot markets, the prices of the Henry Hub will be included in the analysis. Henry
Hub is the largest of 39 trading hubs in the US connecting 13 pipelines. Monthly average spot
prices are taken from the Oil & Gas Journal Energy Database and are quoted in US $/MBTU.
We use LNG USA, LNG Europe and LNG Japan to denote the LNG import price in each; Pipe
Europe and Pipe USA refer to the pipeline gas import price in each. Henry Hub represents the
natural gas price traded in the Henry Hub, and Brent, the price of the Brent as defined above.
Figure 1 shows the prices of interest in log level, and Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics
of the prices in level and log-level. Prices reflect extraordinary events such as the Gulf War (January
1991), the Californian Energy Crisis (late 2000) and the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001
(see Figure 1). The rise in world oil prices during 1999 and the sustained high level of oil product
prices during 2000 and into 2001 has resulted in significant increases in most gas prices throughout
the world. Moreover, American gas prices shot up at the end of 2000 because of record demand,
less natural gas than usual in storage, some bottleneck problems at points in the system and high
oil prices, but return to prior levels after only two months (see Eurogas Economic Study Task
Force, 2001). European and Japanese natural gas prices do not reflect this peak as clearly.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Stationary Properties of the Time Series
It is well known that most financial times series are not (covariance) stationary. Since the late
1980s and the seminal work of Engle and Granger (Engle and Granger, 1987), co-integration has
emerged as a powerful framework for investigating shared trends in multivariate and non stationary
time series, providing a set of procedures for modelling both long-run and short-run dynamics.
The first step in testing for shared stochastic trends is to test for stochastic trends (unit roots) in
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the autoregressive representation of each individual time series and thus to determine the degree
of integration of each series. A series with no deterministic component which has a stationary,
invertible ARMA representation after differencing d times, is said to be integrated of order d,
denoted I(d). To address the topic of the degree of integration, two unit root tests are used:
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (t-ratio), denoted ADF and the Phillips-Perron test (t-ratio),
denoted PP. Prices are used in log levels. For the ADF test, the lag length value is set to the order
selected by the Akaike information criterion plus two (see Pantula et al., 1994). Most of the series
seem not to be trending, except Pipe USA and Henry Hub, for which the absence of a linear trend
is not so clear (Figure 1). The presence of a linear trend is thus tested for these two with the φ3
statistic of Dickey-Fuller. Pipe USA and Henry Hub are not found to be trending (see L’He´garet,
2003). We apply the two tests to data in level and then in first differences to test for the degree
at which prices are stationary.
Table 2 presents the results of the two tests. All prices, in log level, are found I(1) at the 5%
level, except LNG Europe and LNG Japan. The ADF test may indicate that for LNG Europe
and LNG Japan, the integration degree is more than one, but the PP test, as well as graphical
considerations, indicate that these prices are I(1). Consequently, all prices in log levels are assumed
to be I(1). In this case, we can use cointegration analysis. xt, a N -dimensional process, is co-
integrated if each component the process is I(1) but there exists α, a N -dimensional vector,
such that α′xt ∼ I(0). Each vector corresponding to a stationary linear combination is called
a cointegrating vector and acts like a long-term relation in the system. Furthermore, r linearly
independent cointegrating vectors are equivalent to have N − r stochastic trends in the process
(Engle and Granger, 1987). r, the dimension of the space spanned by the cointegrating vectors, is
called the cointegration rank.
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4.2 Principal Component Analysis
Co-movements and co-integration can be analyzed with Principal Component Analysis: examina-
tion of the empirical covariance matrix can give indications about the cointegration rank and the
cointegrating vectors 2.
A principal component analysis is thus performed with the seven prices in log level for the
largest period without missing values for the seven prices, 1997 : 04− 2002 : 06. Table 3 presents
the results of the analysis. Examination of the stationary properties of the principal components
3 tends to prove that there are least two stochastic trends in the multivariate system. The fact
that at least the two first eigenvalues of the empirical covariance matrix are non-null (see Table 3)
confirms that point.
As a consequence, colinearity between the projections in the first factorial plane (spanned by
the two first principal components) of two prices should be seen as a rule of thumb as a necessary
condition for co-integration between those prices. In our analysis, the first component represents
the usual size effect with variables which are all positively correlated. The second component is
more interesting because it puts the stress on more differences between prices. The first factorial
plane (see Figure 2) clearly shows two groups. The first one is LNG Europe, Pipe Europe and
LNG Japan; the second one is Henry Hub and Pipe US. LNG US and Brent are not close to any
group, but Brent is colinear to Group 1 and LNG US to Group 2, so that Brent could be expected
to belong to Group 1 and LNG US to Group 2. As the third column of Table 3 (components of
the third eigenvectors) shows, the third principal component underlines the link between Pipe US,
Henry Hub but separates LNG USA from this group. For the third component, LNG Europe and
Pipe Europe are very close, but Brent and LNG Japan are far from the European gas prices. As
2See L’He´garet (2003) for details on the link between Principal Component Analysis and Co-integration.
3Let denote T the sample size, xt the 7-dimensional log prices process, MT the empirical covariance matrix
divided by T , {fi,T , 1 ≤ i ≤ 7} the eigenvectors of the empirical covariance matrix MT , λi,T its eigenvalues, with
λ1,T ≥ λ2,T ≥ . . . ≥ λ7,T ≥ 0. Unit root tests, performed in the same way as in Section 4.1, applied to x′tfi,T , the
i-th principal component, show clearly that at least the two first principal components are I(1).
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the stationary properties of the third principal component are more contestable than the two first
ones, the results involving the third component are debatable.
The Principal Component Analysis suggests co-movements within the European/Japanese and
the North American prices, but that the European/Japanese and North American markets are
connected to a much lesser extent. This would support our hypothesis of a split prevailing between
the European and the North American gas markets in the 1990’s. We formally test this hypothesis
using co-integration tests in the following section.
4.3 Cointegration Methodology: the Empirical Model Specification
Two different tests for cointegration are commonly used in the literature. They are the Engle and
Granger test (Engle and Granger, 1987) and the Johansen test (Johansen, 1995). We here use the
latter, since hypothesis testing on the the cointegration vectors is possible only in this framework.
The Johansen tests are based on the eigenvalues of a stochastic matrix and in fact reduce to a
canonical correlation problem similar to that of principal components. They are based on the Error
Correction form of the multivariate system (VEC):
∆Xt = Σk−1i=1 Γi∆Xt−i +ΠXt−k + µ+ ²t.
When there exist r linearly independent co-integrating vectors, Πk may be written −αβ′, where
both α and β are N × r matrices with rank r. β contains the co-integrating vectors and α
adjustment parameters and the Johansen procedure allows testing on coefficients α and β, using
several likelihood ratio tests. A bivariate co-integration analysis is performed for each couple of
variables in log level. Some groups of three or four variables are also studied with the Johansen test
to check the coherence of the bivariate results. For each Johansen test, the following methodology
is used 4.
Likelihood ratio tests are used to test for the significance of the lags in the unrestricted VAR
4See L’He´garet (2003) for details.
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in log level. As previously seen, no price is trending, so among the five deterministic trend cases
considered by Johansen (1995), only two cases are considered. Let us denote as Model 2 the VEC
model without linear trend and as Model 1, the VEC model without linear trend and without
intercept in the cointegrating equation. The Johansen test is performed with the previous selected
lag length for both models. By imposing the cointegration rank, a likelihood ratio test is performed
to test whether Model 2 can be restricted to Model 1. The absence of autocorrelation in the
estimated VEC residuals are tested as well as the normality of their empirical distribution. If
there is strong evidence that the normality assumption is violated and/or whether there are outlier
values for the co-integrating equation residuals, intervention dummies are used5. If the rank of
cointegration is found to be equal to the number of prices in the system minus one, there is only one
stochastic trend in the system and each pair of prices is cointegrated. In this case, the Law of One
Price (LOP) is tested by testing the linear restriction on the co-integrating space co-integrating
vectors sum to zero against the unrestricted VEC, given the rank of cointegration and with the
previously selected model (see Asche et al., 2002). If the LOP holds, every relative price in the
system of interest is constant in the long term. In the case where the cointegration rank is strictly
less than the number of prices minus one, the exclusion of one price out of the co-integrating space
can be tested in the same way, and if this is accepted, the excluded price is not linked in the long
term with the other prices.
5As we assume that no event could have caused a permanent shift in the prices, transitory blip dummies for
the VEC - which corresponds to an impulse effect on the prices - are used following Hendry and Juselius (1999).
The transitory blip dummy Dxxyy is unity for t = 19xx : yy, -1 for t = 19xx : yy + 1 and zero otherwise. As
the components of this dummy sum to zero, they do not not affect the Johansen test critical values. Dummies are
chosen according to economic considerations (for instance, months of the Californian Energy Crisis) and examining
the residual values in the same way as in Hendry and Juselius (1999).
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4.4 Cointegration Tests Results
4.4.1 Cointegration in the American Markets
The North American markets show an intense level of integration: evidence for co-integration is
rather strong for LNG USA and the Henry Hub, as well as for LNG USA and Pipe USA (see
Table 4). Surprisingly, the pair Henry Hub, Pipe USA is found to be co-integrated only at the 10%
level6. Therefore, without dummies, co-integration is found at the 5% level, which is an evidence
of co-integration.
At the 5% level, the LOP is rejected for each pair, except for Henry Hub, Pipe USA. It may
indicate that the relative prices for LNG USA and Henry Hub, as well as for LNG USA and Pipe
USA are not constant in the long term, whereas they are for Henry Hub and Pipe USA7. This
point may reflect the differences in the pricing structures: LNG USA is supposed to be indexed
to pipeline spot prices (Henry Hub) whereas pipeline gas may be linked by efficient arbitrage
mechanisms to Henry Hub. Notice that the first factorial plane results (see Figure 2) confirm this
point: relatively to the two first principal components, Henry Hub and Pipe USA are very close
to each other whereas LNG USA is only colinear to them.
4.4.2 Cointegration in the European and Japanese Markets
The European and Japanese markets (LNG Japan, LNG Europe, Pipe Europe and Brent) are
found to be integrated. Each pair of prices, with the exception of LNG Japan and Pipe Europe,
are found to be cointegrated at the 1% level (see Table 4). Studying the group LNG Europe, LNG
Japan and Pipe Europe, two relations are found at the 1% level, which may indicate that the link
between LNG Japan and Pipe Europe is the weakest in this group of markets.
Moreover, the LOP holds in the group LNG Europe, LNG Japan, Pipe Europe, so that relative
prices should be assumed to be constant in the long term. Bivariate tests of the LOP between
6The Null hypothesis of no co-integration is accepted at the 5% level but rejected at the 10% level.
7See Asche et al. (2002) for more details on this interpretation.
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LNG Europe, LNG Japan and Pipe Europe confirm this point: the LOP is accepted for each pair,
except LNG Europe and Pipe Europe, but for this pair the cointegration vector is very close to
(1,−1) (see Table 5).
In addition, the LOP is rejected for the group Brent, LNG Japan, LNG Europe and Pipe
Europe. Bivariate tests for the LOP, with the pairs formed by Brent and prices among LNG
Europe, LNG Japan and Pipe Europe, confirm this point by showing that the LOP does not hold
between Brent and natural gas prices in Europe/Japan (see Table 5). As for the American market,
the first factorial plane confirms these results. On the one hand, LNG Europe, LNG Japan and
Pipe Europe are very close to each other - they share the same stochastic trend - and within them,
the LOP holds. On the other hand, Brent is only colinear to the group: Brent shares the same
stochastic trend, thus each price is linked to it in the long term, but the relative prices of LNG
Europe, LNG Japan and Pipe Europe to the Brent are not constant in the long term. (LNG Japan,
Brent) is the pair for which the LOP is the most clearly rejected, which may be due to the fact
that the indexation of the LNG in Japanese long-term contracts does not have a linear shape, but
might have the shape of an S curve.
4.4.3 Cointegration between the European, Japanese and North-American Markets
The previous results have shown clearly two groups in which cointegration is found between prices.
Among the twelve pairs of prices of these two groups, eight are clearly non-cointegrated. For the
four other pairs (LNG Europe and Henry Hub, LNG Europe and Pipe USA, Brent and LNG
USA, Henry Hub and LNG Japan), whether there is cointegration or not depends on the model.
Consequently, the likelihood ratio test for the model selection is not well-fitted and the model
selection is ambiguous (see Table 3).
Consequently, systems of three prices are investigated. These groups are made of two prices,
which are found to be strongly cointegrated in the bivariate framework and are in the same market
(European/Japanese or American), and by a third price, not in this market. Table 6 reports the
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Johansen test results. In each group, only one cointegrating relation is found at the 5% level with
each model 8. Furthermore, the exclusion of the third price is, in four groups, clearly accepted.
As a consequence, it can be assumed that no combined pair of prices is cointegrated and that the
European and Japanese markets are disconnected in the long-term with the North American one.
But notice that our results are not so clear for each group, for instance LNG Europe, LNG
USA and LNG Japan. Johansen test results for this group are reported in Table 6. As expected,
one cointegrating relation is found, but the exclusion of LNG USA of the cointegrating space is
rejected at the 5% level. However, it is accepted at the 1% level. Examination of the estimated
cointegration relation is instructive: the proximity to zero of the LNG USA component 9 may only
suggest that LNG USA does not appear in the long-term relation between LNG Japan and LNG
Europe.
5 Conclusion
This paper has explored the behavior of European, Japanese and North American gas prices
and their interrelations, from the mid-1990s until the beginning of this decade. The principal
component analysis has shown co-movements within the European/Japanese and the North Amer-
ican prices but a certain split between European/Japanese and North American markets. The
Johansen test procedure has confirmed this result through evidence of cointegration within the
European/Japanese and the North American markets as well as no cointegration between the two
groups of markets. This result converges with the conventional wisdom that gas markets used to
be non-integrated across continents, and in particular the divide between the European and the
North American gas markets during the 1990s.
8For LNG Europe, LNG USA, Pipe USA, the model 1 indicates no cointegration. This result contradicts the
clear cointegration between LNG USA and Pipe USA, so that it is not taken into account and the model 2 is used.
9The estimated cointegrating vector for LNG Japan, LNG Europe, LNG USA, with normalization of its first
component is (1,-1.11,0.21), with 0.09 and 0.08 as standard errors for the second, respectively third component.
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This situation could be changing now. Not only traders but also researchers and industry
are increasingly citing facts that point towards intensified repercussions between the three for-
merly segmented regional markets in Europe, North America, and Asia (Cornot-Gandolphe, 2003;
Deutsche Bank, 2003; Jensen, 2003). It seems as if a transatlantic LNG market is emerging, with
spot trading and physical arbitrage between European and US markets gaining momentum. For
further research, this movement toward a globalized market for natural gas should be studied. An
interesting hypothesis to study further would be that of a collapse of the split of Europe and North
America and the emergence of a globalized natural gas market.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N. of obs. Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skew. Kurt.
Brent Level 156 90:01-02:12 3.68 0.96 1.80 6.63 0.72 3.31
Log 1.27 0.26 0.59 1.89 0.02 2.95
Pipe Europe Level 127 92:01-02:07 2.65 0.44 1.68 3.9 0.47 3.83
Log 0.96 0.17 0.52 1.36 -0.18 3.71
LNG Japan Level 127 92:09-02:09 3.74 0.59 2.74 5.12 0.48 2.51
Log 1.31 0.15 1.01 1.63 0.17 2.42
Pipe USA Level 114 93:01-02:06 2.43 1.22 1.34 9.45 3.00 14.25
Log 0.81 0.36 0.29 2.25 1.49 5.54
Henry Hub Level 109 93:11-02:11 2.73 1.24 1.42 8.50 2.31 9.93
Log 0.93 0.37 0.35 2.14 0.97 3.94
LNG USA Level 104 96:07-02:06 2.80 0.78 1.77 6.41 2.05 8.76
Log 1.00 0.24 0.57 1.86 1.01 4.65
LNG Europe Level 64 97:04-02:07 2.84 0.63 1.8 4.1 0.15 2.27
Log 1.02 0.23 0.59 1.41 -0.25 2.24
19
Table 2: Unit Root tests
Market Log Levels First differenced of log levels
ADF PP ADF PP
Brent -1.88 -1.91 -3.85*** -9.55***
LNG US -1.75 -2.65* -5.47*** -13.44***
LNG Europe -1.45 -1.10 -2.31 -6.21 ***
Pipe Europe -2.06 -1.74 -4.08*** -10.00***
LNG Japan -2.17 -1.63 -2.86* -9.57***
Henry Hub -2.07 -2.22 -4.10*** -8.50***
Pipe US -1.94 -1.91 -5.74*** -9.55***
Note: Tests for prices in level use a constant but not a time trend. Tests for first differences are performed with
neither intercept nor linear trend. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, two asterisks show significance
at the 5% level and three asterisks, significance at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Principal Component Analysis of Brent, Pipe Europe, LNG Europe, Henry
Hub, LNG Japan, LNG US and Pipe US, from 1997:04 to 2002:06
Covariance Matrix of the log levels
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4 Comp.5 Comp.6 Comp.7
Eigenvalue 0.48 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Var. Prop. 0.81 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Cumul. Prop. 0.81 0.90 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Eigenvectors
Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 Vector 5 Vector 6 Vector 7
LNG US 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.65 -0.55 -0.13 0.00
Pipe US 0.54 0.44 -0.10 0.20 0.68 0.08 -0.05
HHub 0.50 0.32 -0.18 -0.65 -0.42 -0.06 0.10
Brent 0.40 -0.57 -0.58 0.25 -0.15 0.30 -0.12
LNG Europe 0.28 -0.30 0.46 -0.20 0.06 -0.14 -0.74
LNG Japan 0.25 -0.38 0.03 0.02 0.17 -0.76 0.42
Pipe Europe 0.26 -0.28 0.56 -0.11 0.06 0.53 0.49
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Table 4: Bivariate Johansen Test Results
Henry Hub Pipe USA LNG USA LNG Europe Brent LNG Japan
Pipe USA 11.25*
18.07*
4.44**
LNG USA 16.44*** 14.60**
27.75*** 38.42***
7.75*** 19.58***
LNG Europe 15.05** 12.75** 7.54
17.69 15.86 9.97
0.30 0.12
Brent 6.23 5.36 13.93** 30.23***
12.99 9.13 16.57 33.89***
0.64 0.30
LNG Japan 7.64 3.84 8.21 26.02*** 14.50**
18.37* 13.25 14.12 42.60*** 59.37***
5.83** 12.28*** 41.1***
Pipe Europe 8.46 7.37 7.04 16.88*** 26.73*** 10.26
13.37 10.88 10.19 21.00** 34.45*** 19.60*
1.74 0.02 2.93*
Note: For each pair of prices, the first/second number is the trace statistic for the Null hypothesis of no cointegration
in Model 1/Model 2. If one or two of these values are found to be significant, the likelihood ratio to test if Model
2 could be restricted to Model 1, given a cointegration rank of one, is reported as a third number. With this
statistic, Model 1 or Model 2 is selected (trace statistics are in bold for the selected model row). For each pair, the
period used is the longest with available data for both prices. If found necessary, dummies are used. An asterisk
indicates significance at the 10% level, two asterisks significance at the 5% level and three asterisks significance at
the 1% level. Johansen test critical values are those from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The likelihood ratio statistic is
distributed as a χ2 with one degree of freedom.
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Table 5: Estimated Cointegrated Vector and Law of One Price
Pair LOP L.R. Coint. Vector
Brent, LNG Japan 39.2*** 1, -1.51
(0.04)
Brent, Pipe Europe 20.32*** 1, -1.28
(0.03)
LNG Europe, Brent 23.25*** 1,-0.80
(0.02)
LNG Europe, Pipe Europe 10.38*** 1,-1.04
(0.01)
LNG Europe, LNG Japan 1.65 1,-1.08
(0.07)
LNG Japan, Pipe Europe 0.39 1,-0.87
(0.14)
Henry Hub, Pipe USA 2.97* 1,-0.85
(0.07)
Henry Hub, LNG USA 6.66*** 1,-0.67
(0.07)
LNG USA, Pipe USA 16.21*** 1,-0.59
(0.05)
Note: For each pair of prices, the first number is the likelihood ratio statistic to test if the cointegrating vector is
summing to zero, given one cointegration relation. It is distributed as a χ2 with one degree of freedom. The second
column reports the estimated cointegrating vector with the Likelihood-based approach of Johansen. The vector is
normalized by the non-restrictive condition that its first component is one. Standard error is reported below the
second component. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, two asterisks significance at the 5% level and
three asterisks significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Multivariate Johansen Test Results
Group Trace Statistic Likelihood Ratio Statistic
r = 0 r ≤ 1 Model 1/ model 2 Price out of the coint. space
LNG Japan, Brent, Henry Hub 24.19** 5.83 33.12*** Henry Hub
65.68*** 14.21 0.08
LNG Europe, LNG USA, Henry Hub 36.00*** 12.00* 14.52*** LNG Europe
52.13*** 13.60 0.50
LNG Europe, LNG USA, Pipe USA 21.00 7.96 15.7*** LNG Europe
42.04*** 13.32 0.48
Brent, LNG Europe, LNG USA 37.46*** 8.37 0.12 LNG USA
41.32*** 12.01 0.00
LNG Europe, LNG Japan, LNG USA 39.80*** 9.29 14.96*** LNG USA
58.03*** 13.57 4.67**
Note: For each group, the trace statistics in Model 1/Model 2 are reported at the beginning of the first/second row.
r is the cointegration rank. For each group, two likelihood ratio statistics are reported. The first one is the likelihood
ratio to test if Model 2 could be restricted to Model 1, given a cointegration rank of one. With this statistic, Model
1 or Model 2 is selected (trace statistics are in bold for the selected model row). The second one is the likelihood
ratio statistic to test if one price can be eliminated for the cointegration space in the model previously selected.
An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level, two asterisks significance at the 5% level and three asterisks
significance at the 1% level. Johansen test critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The likelihood ratio
statistic is distributed as a χ2 with one degree of freedom.
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Figure 1: Prices in log level
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